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ANALYZING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE
HERBERT G. KEENE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the widespread problem of sexual har-
assment1 by approaching the topic in a unique way. Specifically,
three different vignettes are presented, each of which contains a
few scenes. These scenes are followed by an in-depth analysis of
each situation. Since the law in the area of sexual harassment is
still evolving,2 definitive bright line tests are nearly impossible to
Herbert G. Keene, Jr., is a partner in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania law
firm Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP. Mr. Keene has been involved in the
representation of management in labor and employment relations matters for the
past thirty years. He received his formal education at Holy Cross College and
Georgetown University Law School. He is a member of the Bar of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his associates, Tim D.
Norris, Cathleen M. Stryker, Stephen B. Nolan, and Farrah Lyn Walker.
1 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, PRIMER ON SExuAL HAR-
ASSMENT 2 (1992) [hereinafter LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER] (stating various
studies have reported 50 to 80 percent of women have experienced sexual harass-
ment on job, and harassment may be most widespread problem facing American
women at work); see also Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII
for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1258 (1987) (stating sexual harassment of women in workplace is widespread and
insidious problem).
2 See generally Kathleen A. Smith, Employer Liability For Sexual Harassment:
Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (1987) (noting inconsisten-
cies of evolution of law under Title VII); Anderson, supra note 1, at 1258 (noting re-
cent development in evolving law under Title VII); Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, The
Present State of Sexual Harassment Law: Perpetuating Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
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recite. This article instead attempts to enlighten and raise one's
consciousness in the area of sexual harassment.
A. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment is conduct which falls under and is pro-
hibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.3 The Act was
significantly amended in 1991. 4 Title VII claims apply only to
employers who have fifteen or more employees.5 Like other dis-
crimination claims, Title VII claims are typically brought
through and processed6 by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC). 7
A complaint brought by an aggrieved employee triggers an
order in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301 (1994) (noting evolu-
tion in law on sexual harassment).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988); see Mary C. Dunlap, ed. Sex Discrimination
in Employment: Application of Title VII (CLR Employment Law File, 1975) 1 3001
(noting unlawful discrimination under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 consists
of any action, policy or practice of an employer, employment agency or labor organi-
zation, causing or contributing to unequal employment opportunity on account of
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion).
4 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see DAVID A. CATHCART ET AL.,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 1-2 (1993) (remarking that Civil Rights Act of 1991
was result of compromises within Congress and between Congress and Bush Ad-
ministration to effect profound changes in federal employment discrimination juris-
prudence).
The impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was the dissatisfaction with a series
of six decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in May and June of 1989. See,
e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 490
U.S. 900 (1989); Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zepes, 491 U.S. 754
(1989); ROGER CLEGG ET AL., THE CIVL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: A SYMPOSIUM 1459
(1994).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). The term "employer" means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day but the term does not include 1) the United States, a corporation owned by the
government of the United States, an Indian tribe or any development or agency of
the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the Competitive Service,
or 2) certain bona fide private membership clubs. Id.
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (1988).
' See ARTHUR GUTMAN, EEO LAW AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES 7 (1993) (EEOC
is an independent Federal Administrative Agency mandated by Title VII to focus on
acts of discrimination against identifiable victims); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAw 2000 (1988) (noting that EEOC has four major statutory
functions: 1) investigation and conciliation of possible violations, 2) enforcement, 3)
interpretation, and 4) implementation of enforcement procedures against federal
employers).
ANALYZING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
investigation by the EEOC. After a thorough investigation, the
EEOC determines whether probable cause exists. Several courts
have deemed evidence of such findings admissible.8
After a period of normally 180 days, a claimant then has a
right to institute a Title VII action in Federal District Court.9 All
remedies generally available under Title VII, such as compensa-
tory and punitive damages, case discharge, and reinstatement
with back pay, are also available in a sexual harassment case. 1°
These remedies are also available in constructive discharge
cases-where an individual claims that his or her employment
had become so intolerable that they had to quit."
Sexual harassment is generally defined as unwelcome 2 sex-
ual attention, sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual nature. 3
Sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII under either one of
two legal theories: "quid pro quo"'4 and "hostile environment." 5
Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves the commission of such
conduct, which is made explicitly or implicitly a term of one's
See, e.g., Casey v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. CIV. A. 85-5924, 1987 WL 9292
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (upholding presumption of trustworthiness of EEOC determina-
tions); Maskin v. Chromalloy American Corp., No. 84-1952, slip op. at 14 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (holding that EEOC determination held admissible in Title VII sex discrimi-
nation action).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5f03) (1988).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
" There are four factors in determining whether a "quit" is a constructive dis-
charge: 1) Was there illegal treatment of the plaintiff; 2) Was the resignation caused
by the illegal treatment; 3) Was the treatment designed to force the employee to re-
sign; and 4) If the employer had no desire to discharge the employee, were the ac-
tions reasonable. PLAYER, supra note 7, at 402.
2 See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 168 (1986) (holding that
essential element of any sexual harassment claim is that alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding "unwelcome" means that employee did not solicit or incite conduct,
and regarded it as undesirable or offensive).
13 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994); see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979) (defining sexual harassment as
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in context of relationship of unequal
power).
1 This phrase was coined from MACKINNON, supra note 13.
Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon is generally acknowledged as having first
expressed this distinction. MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 32-47; see also Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); PLAYER, supra note 7, at 249; LINDEMANN
& KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 9.
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employment. 6 Hostile work environment sexual harassment is
conduct that is so pervasive and offensive that it creates an in-
timidating, abusive, and hostile work environment and unrea-
sonably interferes with the victim's ability to perform his or her
job. 7 Although conduct does not need to be sexual per se to be
deemed sexual harassment, it must be gender-based. 8 Further-
more, Title VII protects both men and women from sexual har-
assment in the work-place. 9
To determine what constitutes an effective harassment pol-
icy a distinction must be made between common law claims and
Title VII claims. With regard to Title VII claims, if there is an
appropriate policy in effect, and it is promptly and effectively
implemented when an alleged harassment situation arises, then
normally, unless an upper-level manager is involved, it will con-
stitute a defense. 0 Nevertheless, an employer must demonstrate
that such a harassment policy was promptly and effectively ap-
plied in that the employer addressed the individuals involved
and took swift corrective, remedial action." Courts, in many
16 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1), (2) (1994) (quid pro quo sexual harassment oc-
curs when woman's submission to her supervisor's sexual demands becomes condi-
tion of her employment status).
17 See id. note 16, at § 1604.11(a)(3) (sexual harassment is actionable whenever
it unreasonably interferes with work performance).
18 Behavior motivated by gender-based animosity usually takes on one of two
forms: 1) hostile conduct of a sexual nature (gender baiting), or 2) nonsexual hazing
based on gender. LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 75.
19 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983) (holding men as well as women are protected from sexual discrimination).
But see Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding man's sexual
harassment claim not actionable since male harassers did not treat complainant as
inferior because of his sex).
20 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1994). An effective plan requires that the em-
ployer affirmatively raise the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing ap-
propriate sanctions, and informing employees of their right to file a complaint under
Title VII. Id.; see also Brief for United States and the EEOC as Amici Curiae, Meri-
tor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). If an employer has a pol-
icy against sexual harassment and a procedure to resolve sexual harassment
complaints, the employer should not be liable unless he has actual knowledge of
sexually hostile environment. Id. But see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
71 (1986) (mere existence of sexual harassment policy and procedure does not insu-
late employer from liability). By using the term "mere existence," however, the Su-
preme Court suggests that an appropriately designed sexual harassment policy may
constitute a defense to the employer. Anderson, supra note 1, at 1270.
21 See, e.g., Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich.
1977). An employer must swiftly prevent or rectify situation to avoid being respon-
sible for sexual harassment of employees. Id. at 460. For example, if an employee
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cases, have granted summary judgment for employers who are
able to prove they had effective harassment policies in place at
the time of the complaint."
On the other hand, common law claims are not causes of ac-
tion that arise under Title VII.23 However, an employer can get a
summary judgment or dismissal of a common law claim with the
use of normal defenses.24
Vignette #1: Close Quarters
Scene #1
ANN: Hello, Receiving Department. Yes. I am the manager.
How can I help you? Okay, you have the address. Thanks.
Bye.
OSCAR: Hey, I'm sorry I'm late.
ANN: Here we go again!
OSCAR: Oh, come on! It's not such a big deal.
ANN: Listen, we had a deal. You said that you were going to
stop being late and I wasn't going to put it in your evaluation.
OSCAR: Well, if I show you why I was late, perhaps, you will for-
get all about it.
ANN: This better be good.
OSCAR: (showing an adult magazine picture) My latest. What
fails to investigate a complaint he is supporting the harassment because an absence
of sanctions encourages abusive behavior. Id. at 466.
22 See, e.g., Tolbert v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours Co. & Stevens, 850 F.2d 693,
695 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining complainant's failure to file grievance and notify
Dupont management of alleged sexual harassment was contributing factor in com-
plainant's failure to make satisfactory showing of harassment).
2 Common law theories of recovery for sexual harassment can take form of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
invasion of privacy, defamation, misrepresentation, breach of public policy, implied
contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with con-
tractual relations, and negligent hiring or retention. LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 351-52 (1992) [hereinafter LINDEMANN &
KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT].
24 See, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 1994 WL 447406 (E.D. Pa.)
(granting employers motion for summary judgment on sexual harassment claim
which also took form of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
breach of contract and collective bargaining agreement, and misrepresentation),
afld, 39 F.3d 1169 (3d Cir. 1994).
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do you think?
ANN: You wish you could get a woman like that.
OSCAR: What do you mean? This is my girlfriend.
ANN: Right!
OSCAR: Well, I've had nearly every woman in the department.
What makes you think I couldn't have her?
ANN: Well, that's no big feat, considering the sleazy bimbos we
have in this department.
OSCAR: Yeah, they may be bimbos, but some of them are pretty
hot. I bet some of them could make it into this magazine.
ANN: Name one.
OSCAR: What about Margaret? Did you see what she had on to-
day? It should be illegal. There's only so much a man can take.
ANN: Just perfect for you, buxom and brainless.
OSCAR: Ann, there are some things you don't need brains for.
ANN: Obviously, like working here!
OSCAR: (showing Ann another picture) Oh, this looks like Mi-
chelle from payroll.
BETH: (answering phone) Hello, Receiving.
ANN: Are there any guys in there?
OSCAR: Yeah, here's one. I wish I were he.
ANN: Wishing is about all you can do (takes magazine). Wait,
I'll find you a date. Are there any personals?
OSCAR: I don't need personals, Ann.
ANN: Here is one for you (reading): Sultry and seductive. Sexy,
twenty-three year old, white female seeking very generous man
that will enjoy my full attention at a very private and discreet
location.
OSCAR: It doesn't sound half bad. Maybe I'll be late again to-
morrow.
BETH: (on phone) Look, let me call you back in a few minutes.
Something has come up here.
(To audience) This has been going on ever since I joined this de-
partment. Ann and Oscar carry on with these explicit, sexual
comments. I feel like I'm being called a bimbo. These com-
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ments are upsetting and these conversations make it hard for
me to concentrate on my work. It's hard for me to talk on the
telephone. Can I file a complaint? Does this constitute sexual
harassment?
Scene Analysis
This situation raises several issues. The first question is
whether activity occurring in an office next to Beth can consti-
tute sexual harassment as to her. Does the conduct have to be
directed at her? Generally, the answer is that it does not have to
be directed at the individual at all.25 If the conduct takes place
in the work place, and the complainant, as a reasonable person,"
is offended by that conduct, it may well constitute hostile envi-
ronment or work place harassment.27
25 See LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 211 (EEOC supports
hostile environment claim by employees who were not themselves specific targets of
harassment); see also Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590
(1989) (recognizing nurse's sexual harassment claim against doctor whose offensive
remarks and touchings were directed at other nurses but in complainant's pres-
ence). But see Ross v. Double Diamond, 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (declining
to consider sexual harassment claim of complainant who knew about her co-worker's
mistreatment).
Although relatively few authorities squarely support the EEOC's theory of third
party claim of sexual harassment based upon environmental harassment directed at
employees other than the complainant, cases do support the EEOC theory in dic-
tum. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating, in dic-
tum, that woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have Title
VII claim if forced to work in atmosphere pervasive with harassment). See also
LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 212 n.56.
21 In hostile environment cases, most courts have used a two-pronged standard
to assess liability: (1) whether there was psychological harm and (2) whether a rea-
sonable person in the complainant's position would have suffered that harm. David
D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment at Work, C742 ALI-ABA 465, 483 (1992). The reason-
able person standard is designed to prevent liability arising from the overreactions
of a hypersensitive complainant. Id.
Some courts consider the sex of the complainant in applying the reasonable per-
son standard. Id. at 485. Thus, a "reasonable woman" standard has developed. Id.;
see, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e believe that
women share concerns which men do not necessarily share .... [Bjecause women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger in-
centive to be concerned with sexual behavior.").
17 There are two principal types of sexual harassment under Title VII: (1) Quid
pro quo discrimination and (2) hostile work environment harassment. Martin v.
Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1993). Quid pro quo is
the more obvious form of sexual harassment and generally involves the offer of tan-
gible employment benefits by an employer or supervisor in exchange for sexual fa-
vors from the subordinate employee. Jeffrey A. Gettle, Sexual Harassment and the
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Another issue raised by this scene is whether Ann, who
seems to participate in the conduct, would be able to complain
about it. The answer obviously is no.28 If she participates in the
conduct, then the conduct is welcome as to her. If the conduct is
welcomed, it is deemed consensual. 9 By virtue of the EEOC °
and judicial authority,3" Ann would not have grounds for a com-
plaint.
Is the conduct gender-based?32 The conversation was very
gender-based-very anti-female. This, then, gives Beth the abil-
ity to file a harassment complaint.33
Does the fact that Ann is a supervisor and engages in such
conduct impute liability to her employer? The EEOC has set
Reasonable Woman Standard: Is it a Viable Solution?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 841, 842
(1993). Hostile environment sexual harassment consists of conduct that has the ef-
fect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance, or conduct
which creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
's A threshold issue in any sexual harassment case is whether the conduct was
welcome. Kadue, supra note 26, at 483. Unwelcome conduct is conduct that the re-
cipient does not ask for and regards as offensive. Id.
See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sex-
ual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 530 (1994). But see Spencer v. General
Electric, 697 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988) (explaining pervasive sexual conduct can
create hostile work environment for those who find it offensive even if targets of
conduct welcome it); LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 44 (discussing
Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552, 44 FEP Cases 1808 (4th Cir. 1987), where court
held that complainant's use of foul language and sexual innuendo indicated that she
welcomed such conduct; however, such use in consensual setting did not waive her
right to complain of unwelcome harassment.
3 See EEOC Notice N-915-050 (Mar. 19, 1990) at 10-11.
31 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., GM Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007
(7th Cir. 1994) (employee's claim is barred when words or deeds welcome harass-
ment); Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, Miss., 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D. Miss.
1986), affd, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendants were not found to have created
hostile environment by virtue of plaintiffs use of vulgar language, making of sexual
jokes and frequent participation in sexual behavior and discussions), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1063 (1988); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986)
("In order to constitute harassment, the conduct must be 'unwelcome' in the sense
that the employee did not solicit or invite it, and the employee regarded the conduct
as undesirable or offensive.").
32 Gender-based sexual harassment is conduct that does not "prove equally of-
fensive to male and female workers." Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
' In order for the conduct to be deemed harassment, it must be based on gen-
der. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987)
(stating hostile work environment sexual harassment claim must be based on sex in
order to prove prima facie case).
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forth a series of guidelines concerning employer liability.34 Gen-
erally, the EEOC and the courts have applied general common
law agency principles to such situations." If Ann were a low-
level supervisor, then liability would be imputed to her employer
if her employer were found to be negligent.36 This standard is
based on whether her employer knew or should have known of
her conduct, and if so, what action it took in response to that
knowledge. The acts of a managing agent or upper-level super-
visor may more readily be imputed to the employer, and the
employer may be held strictly liable for those acts.37 If Ann, as
Vice President of the company, were engaged in such conduct,
her company may be held strictly liable under EEOC guide-
lines.38
Even employers of volunteer workers may be held liable if
the volunteers are creating a hostile work environment or a quid
pro quo.3" Liability depends upon how much control the em-
34 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1994).
" A standard of strict liability has generally been applied to quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994). Such liability has attached even when the employer
has policies prohibiting such conduct by its managers. Debra L. Raskin, Sexual
Harassment in Employment, C108 ALI-ABA 141, 147-48; see Horn v. Duke Homes,
755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979).
In Meritor, however, the Supreme Court suggested that employers would not
automatically be liable in hostile environment claims. 477 U.S. at 72; see also Steele
v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that
"[s]trict liability is illogical in a pure hostile environment setting .... The supervisor
does not act as the company; the supervisor acts outside 'the scope of actual or ap-
parent authority to hire, fire, discipline, or promote.'"); cf. 14 F.3d at 780 ("employer
is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work environment created by supervisor if
the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment, or if
he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the
agency relationship.").
Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780 (stating where low-level supervisor does not rely on
supervisory authority to carry out harassment, employer will not be liable unless
negligent); see Lopez v. S. B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir. 1987); Snell
v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1104 (2d Cir. 1986).
17 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1994) (stating that employer should be liable in
hostile environment case only if it had actual knowledge or victim had no reasonably
available method for making her complaint known).
3 Id.
'9 The EEOC takes the position that an employer is responsible for maintain-
ing an environment free of sexual harassment, including harassment by non-
employees. Id.; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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ployer has over those volunteers.4" If the employer controls the
work setting, he will more likely be held responsible for the acts
of volunteers.4
Imputed liability leads to the question of whether the em-
ployer has a sexual harassment policy. Under EEOC guidelines,
if an employer has a sexual harassment policy that is widely dis-
seminated among employees and is uniformly and effectively en-
forced, liability could be precluded.4" Even if the employer learns
of or should have learned of that conduct, assuming it is re-
peated and it is not an isolated incident, the employer might
avoid liability if an effective policy is in place.43
Scene #2
OSCAR: (taking back magazine) Let me see that. Let me see if
there are some personals in here for you.
ANN: I've got plenty of guys. I don't need any help from you.
OSCAR: Here's one (reading): Serious or casual relationship. A
twenty-seven year old, white male in search of that Victoria Se-
cret model. A white female, age twenty to thirty who is willing
to show me a good time. We can also explore and get to know
each other.
ANN: Hey, kind of sounds like me.
OSCAR: I don't think so.
FRANK: (enters with a package and clipboard) Hey, do you want
to sign for this.
OSCAR: Oh, over here. I was just trying to find Ann here a date.
Check this out! Ann needs a little help with her social life.
FRANK: Hey, maybe I can help.
OSCAR: Maybe we can find you a date, Frank. (points to a pic-
ture) How about this one?
40 In determining liability for acts of a non-employee, the EEOC considers the
extent of the employer's control and legal responsibility over the non-employee. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(e).
41 Id.
41 Id. at § 1604.11(f).
4' EEOC Policy Guidance No. N-915-050, Current Issues of Sexual Harassment
§ (D)(2)(a)(3) (1990); see, e.g., Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 402 (5th
Cir. 1993) (stating that existence of written policy against sexual harassment and
availability of formal grievance procedure "counted strongly" in employer's favor).
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FRANK: Well, she's pretty hot. But actually, I already have my
eye on someone.
OSCAR: Well, keep this warm for me. I have to take this pack-
age upstairs.
ANN: Take a look at this. Oscar claimed that he went out with
her last night.
FRANK: She's pretty hot, but I bet she's nothing compared to
you.
ANN: Sure Frank, like, you'll ever know.
FRANK: (moving closer) Come on, why don't we get a drink to-
night.
ANN: (moving away) I've got to get back to work.
FRANK: Oh, come on. I hear the way you talk to Oscar. I bet
you go out with lots of guys. What's wrong with me?
ANN: No, Frank. I just don't want to.
FRANK: Come on. What harm is there? Just one little drink.
ANN: (cornered against desk) We've been through this before
and I'm not going through it again. I just don't want to go out
with you.
FRANK: (putting his arm around Ann) Look, III tell you what.
I'll be back tomorrow and maybe you will change your mind.
OSCAR: (returning with clipboard) Well, here it is.
FRANK: (grabbing clipboard and exiting) Oh! Okay Bud.
Thanks.
ANN: (to audience) This guy gives me the creeps. He gets too
close to me. He constantly touches me. He asks me out at least
two or three times a week. I'd report him but he doesn't work
for our company. I don't even know if this is sexual harassment.
What can I do?
Scene Analysis
The first question is whether it makes any difference if the
person engaging in the conduct is not employed by the employer.
Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no." If the visitor or the
" An employer may be liable for the harassment of its employees by nonem-
ployees in either of two basic situations: (1) a job requirement that foreseeably sub-
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vendor is somebody who regularly comes to the employer's
premises, and the company either knows or should have known
about the conduct, the company may be held liable." In order to
avoid liability, an employer must demonstrate that it has in
place an effective sexual harassment policy that the employee is
aware of which provides avenues to file a complaint with the
proper individuals within the company." In order to avoid liabil-
ity, Ann's employer must deal with the employer of the delivery
man to see to it that the offending individual either no longer
makes deliveries to that company, or does not regularly have
contact with Ann. 7
The EEOC guidelines approach such situations in the same
way.4" They state that an employer may be responsible for the
harassment of an employee by a nonemployee in the work place
where the employer or its agents or supervisory employees knew
or should have known that the conduct was taking place and
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.49 In
reviewing such cases, the Commission will consider, on a case-
by-case basis, the extent of the employer's control over the
nonemployee, ° and any other legal responsibility that the em-
ployer may have with respect to the conduct of the nonem-
ployee.5"
B. The Nonemployee as Complainant
It is not always required that a complainant demonstrate a
jects employees to sexual harassment, and (2) a failure to take prompt corrective
action when the employer has notice of harassment. Kadue, supra note 26, at 491;
see, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding em-
ployer liable).
45 See Sparks v. Regional Medical Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 738 n.1 (N.D. Ala.
1992) (noting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) makes employer liable for conduct of nonem-
ployees as long as employer knew or should have known of conduct).
See Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1994) (no liabil-
ity given employer's prompt investigation of sexual harassment charge).
"[H]arassment is to be remedied through actions targeted at the harasser,
not at the victim .... Not only did the [defendant] have numerous counseling ses-
sions with [plaintiff] in order to discuss how she could help stop the harassment, it
forced [plaintiff] to work different shift schedules and actively sought to have her
transferred to a different position." Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 780 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
4' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1994).
49 Id.
50 Id.
61 Id.
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common law employment relationship to have standing to bring
a sexual harassment charge under Title VII. 2 Employment, in
this context, is defined as a work setting, and the charge is that
someone in that work setting is causing the harassment. There-
fore, the fact that a complainant is not technically a common law
employee will not necessarily divest such an individual from
standing to bring a charge."
Vignette #2: The Sexual Harassment Complaint
Scene #1
VICKIE: May I see Hugo?
SECRETARY: Do you have an appointment?
VICKIE: No.
SECRETARY: What is this about, honey?
VICKIE: I have a sexual harassment complaint.
SECRETARY: Hey, Hugo! There's a girl here with some sexual
harassment complaint.
HUGO: Send her in. (laughing) What's your name?
VICKIE: Vickie.
HUGO: Hello Vickie, what's the problem?
VICKIE: Well, I wanted to make a complaint. I think it might be
sexual harassment.
HUGO: You think it might be sexual harassment. You mean you
don't know?
VICKIE: I'm pretty sure. Can I sit down?
HUGO: Yes, go ahead. All right, so who are we talking about.
VICKIE: Harry Henderson.
HUGO: Harry Henderson. You mean Harry, the VP of Market-
ing?
VICKIE: Yes.
HUGO: Holy Cow! You've really hooked yourself a big fish this
512 See Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining
thatplaintiff belonging to protected class under Title VII is "not usually disputed").
See id.
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time. I hope you know what you are doing. Okay, so what do
you say has happened?
VICKIE: Well, Harry comes to my department a lot when he goes
to meetings with the CEO. It seems like everyday. Well, some-
times he just comes in and talks to me.
HUGO: Talks to you. Is that what this is about?
VICKIE: No. He keeps asking me out on dates. I feel like he
stands too close to me. He touches me.
HUGO: He touches you? Where does he touch you?
VICKIE: Well, on my arm and on my back. He leaves me notes.
He sends me E-Mails. He tells me how much he likes me. It's
very distracting. I find it very hard to work.
SECRETARY: Oh, that's not so terrible honey. You should be flat-
tered. Harry is a great catch.
HUGO: So, he keeps asking you out. Did you ever go out with
him?
VICKIE: Well, he wouldn't leave me alone, so about a month ago
I went out to dinner with him.
HUGO: Look, I'm a Human Resources man. You know, a couple
months ago I went to a conference and this Philadelphia lawyer
said that for an act to be sexual harassment, it must be unwel-
come. If you went out with him it can't be very unwelcome, can
it?
VICKIE: Well, I just did it so that maybe he would leave me
alone. But, he didn't leave me alone. It has gotten worse. He's
really good friends with my boss. My boss really respects him
and I'm afraid that somehow this is going to hurt my career.
HUGO: Look, Vickie, everybody respects Harry around here.
He's one of the best. Now, you've got every right to make your
harassment complaint, but I have to tell you it's going to be a
long, hard road ahead of you. Did Harry ever say that if you
didn't go out with him, you'd be fired?
VICKIE: No.
HUGO: No. Did Harry every try to kiss you or grope you?
VICKIE: No.
HUGO: No. Did you ever talk to your supervisor about this?
VICKIE: Well, no.
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HUGO: No. Well, you know that our sexual harassment policy
says that you have to talk to your supervisor before you can do
anything else. Are you sure you want to make a complaint?
VICKIE: Well, I guess so.
HUGO: (pauses) You know, I think I can get you a transfer to
Salt Lake City. You wouldn't have to worry about Harry.
Would you be interested in that?
VICKIE: Look, I just want it to stop. I don't necessarily want to
go to Salt Lake City.
HUGO: Okay. Well look, III investigate the matter and get back
to you. You can go.
VICKIE: Thanks.
Scene Analysis
There are probably a dozen or more things that occurred in
this scene which ought not have occurred. The Salt Lake City
transfer, of course, is not something that the employer should
have suggested to someone who has walked in wanting to make
this type of complaint. The cases are clear regarding adverse
action by an employer against an employee who is filing a sexual
harassment complaint." The issue arises as to whether or not
the conduct of the interview itself constitutes sexual harassment
because of the manner in which it was conducted.55 There is also
the question of whether the interview was designed to encourage
frank and open discussion.56 There was certainly no indication
" In Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir.
1989), the Seventh Circuit outlined the elements of a claim of retaliation: the
plaintiff must prove that she (1) "engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2)
she suffered an adverse action by her employer; and (3) there is a causal link be-
tween the protected expression and the adverse action." See EEOC v. Pizza Hut of
Roanoke Rapids, Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1346, 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff in sexual harassment action "establishes a prima facie case [of
retaliation by] showing that she had engaged in protected activity, was subse-
quently fired, and that other employees committing similar offenses .... did not in-
cur as severe a punishment."), afld mem., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 160 (4th
Cir. 1993).
m The EEOC definition of sexual harassment includes situations where
"submission to (the harassment) is made either explicitly or implicitly a term of an
individual's employment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994). It is submitted that Hugo's
conduct in the interview made Vickie's submission to the harassment an implicit
term of her employment.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1994) states that "[a]n employer should take all steps
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that the discussion was confidential or private;7 a secretary
seated outside overheard the conversation and, in fact, took part
in the conversation.58 The interviewer indicates that he has a
very narrow notion as to what sexual harassment consists of by
suggesting that perhaps touching a person's shoulder or back is
not enough.59
There is also the question of the adequacy of the interview."
The interviewer is disbelieving, badgering, condescending, and
does not encourage the complainant to tell her story. In fact, by
his comments, the interviewer is really discouraging her. He
tells her that she has a "long, hard road ahead." He asked no
specific questions as to any of the incidents about which the
woman attempted to complain. There was no indication that he
would follow-up the interview in any substantial manner. He
c0iiducted it very offhandedly. To prevent such problems from
occurring, a sexual harassment policy should include as a com-
ponent some in-house training of sexual harassment interview-
ers.61 Without interviewer training, there is a greater potential
for liability if the matter is litigated.
Scene #2
HARRY: Hugo, come on in.
HUGO: Hi Harry, how have you been?
HARRY: Pretty good. You said on the phone that we have a little
bit of a problem. What's this all about?
HUGO: Well, apparently, you ruffled the feathers of some girl in
Accounting.
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring." It is submitted that this is
accomplished by encouraging open discussion about sexual harassment and also by
allowing this discussion to be confidential, which did not occur in the interview.
17 See supra note 56.
' While it may be necessary for the investigator to discuss the reported infor-
mation with others, such discussion should be limited to those persons with a le-
gitimate need to know. LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 164.
It may be enough to constitute harassment on the basis of sex for one to
make unwelcome sexual advances such as those set forth in the vignette. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
6o See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 162-66
(suggesting guidelines for investigation).
I LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT supra note 23, at 418, 429
(discussing importance of well-trained investigator).
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HARRY: What do you mean? Who are we taking about?
HUGO: Do you know someone named Vickie?
HARRY: Vickie? Did she file a complaint?
HUGO: Yes. But don't worry about it. Our lawyers gave us a
sexual harassment policy a couple of years ago and I just have
to interview you. It's just a formality.
HARRY: Okay, I understand. You have your job to do and I have
mine. You've always been very thorough and that's one of your
good qualities. I'll make sure that your boss knows that when
evaluation time comes around this month.
HUGO: Thanks Harry. You know that you can count on me.
HARRY: Well then, ask away.
HUGO: Look, I know that she is not in your department and its
no big deal, but let me just ask you, did you ask her out?
HARRY: Sure. And we went out. I thought it went really well.
She always seems very nice when we talk and I think she's very
attractive.
HUGO: Okay. Well, did she ever say that she wasn't interested
in you?
HARRY: No. In fact, we've always had such a good time.
HUGO: Okay. So, you went out with her. How did it go?
HARRY: It went fine. Look, Hugo you've known me for a long
time. Ever since you came to this company I've always tried to
be a straight shooter with you. Vickie's cute and I really like
her, but I certainly would never do anything inappropriate, or
put someone in a bad position.
HUGO: I know Harry. I've never known you to be unfair to any-
one. Just one question-you didn't grope her or anything did
you?
HARRY: No, don't be silly. I would never do that kind of thing.
HUGO: Okay. Well, don't worry. I know you're a fair guy and
we will work this thing out.
HARRY: Maybe I should talk to her. You know, just to let her
know that she has nothing to fear from me. I'm just a big teddy
bear.
HUGO: You know Harry, that's probably a good idea. You've al-
ways had a way with women.
36 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No.3
Scene Analysis
The preceding scene raises several questions. Who will con-
duct the interview?62 Will the interviewer be properly trained to
question one accused of sexual harassment? Does the person
have a position of sufficient authority in the company to be taken
seriously by the accused, even if, as in this scene, the accused is
a high ranking officer? If not, some thought ought to be given to
who will conduct the interview of a Vice President of Marketing
if, in fact, there has been a serious allegation of sexual harass-
ment.
There are also a series of issues to consider regarding
whether the interviewer should be employed in-house or be un-
associated with the company. Should attorney-client privilege
apply to such conversations? Can it be utilized in the future if,
in fact, the case proceeds? Or must an employer, as a matter of
its defense, divulge the contents of the investigation? Generally,
an employer must disclose what was learned during the course of
the interview.' Disclosure is used frequently to support what-
ever action is ultimately taken. It is generally not a good idea
for outside counsel to get involved in the investigative stage in
case they later become a witness should a lawsuit be filed.
The interview, as it appears above, was hardly a scathing
examination. It was leading and not really designed to elicit the
necessary information. The conduct of the interviewer did not
induce the interviewee to take the matter seriously. The sug-
gestion that the alleged harasser have further contact with the
complainant is a very poor one. During the course of a sexual
harassment investigation, the interview ought to be conducted
without bringing the complainant and the accused together.
There are some circumstances in which it may be permissible for
both the complainant and the accused to meet together with a
human resource officer in an effort to rectify the problem.'
However, such a solution is generally not advisable, and cer-
tainly not where the alleged conduct appears to be of a very seri-
ous nature.
62 See generally id. at 429-30 (discussing choice of appropriate investigator).
6 Id. at 431-32, 445. Allegations must inevitably be shared, to some extent, to
facilitate the investigation. Id. at 445.
" See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 163-65
(suggesting how to conduct interview with complainant).
ANALYZING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
During the course of the above interview, some degrading
comments were made about Vickie, the complainant. Further-
more, it is irrelevant that she and the accused are not in the
same department because a Vice President of Marketing pre-
sumably has company-wide authority.65
There are several elements of an effective sexual harass-
ment policy.66 The policy ought to be stated in simple, easily un-
derstood language, and should directly outline the prohibited
conduct. Examples of intolerable conduct should be provided.
Conduct such as offensive comments, obscene jokes, and the pos-
session of obscene pictures or objects in the work place ought to
be mentioned in advising employees as to what is prohibited.
The policy should include a direct and conspicuous statement
that the policy will apply to all employees, including supervisory,
management and executive personnel.
The procedure for filing a complaint must also be simply
spelled out. For example, consider the following excerpt from
one company's anti-harassment policy:
Any employee who believes that he or she has been subject to
harassment prohibited by this policy, has a responsibility to re-
port the harassment as soon as possible to the immediate su-
pervisor. If the harassment is being perpetrated by the
immediate supervisor, then the employee may bring his or her
complaint directly to the Human Resources Manager. If the
Human Resources Manager is the source of the complaint, or
where there are other compelling reasons which prevent bring-
ing the problem to the attention of the Human Resources Man-
ager, the employee must report the harassment directly to the
President of the Company. 7
The complainant must have an open avenue to make a
complaint. Therefore, as above, any policy should provide an al-
ternate avenue for seeking relief if the immediate supervisor is
65 A person need not be the complainant's direct supervisor in order to be a
"supervisory employee." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
See LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 151-53 (suggesting
guidelines for employers in developing and implementing effective sexual harass-
ment policy); LINDEMANN & KADuE, SExUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 722
(providing sample anti-harassment policy).
67 Cf LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 151-53 (suggesting
guidelines for employers in developing and implementing effective sexual harass-
ment policy); LINDEMANN & KADUE, SExuAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 722
(providing sample anti-harassment policy).
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the source of the sexual harassment.8 The policy should further
briefly define how the investigation will proceed and should indi-
cate that the information obtained will be held in confidence to
the fullest extent possible. The policy should probably contain a
statement to the effect that the information will only be passed
to other individuals who have a "need to know." The policy
should also provide that if the employee is dissatisfied with the
handling of the investigation or its result, the employee could
bring her complaint to a higher level within the company. In
addition, the policy should clearly state that anyone who is
found, after an appropriate investigation, to have engaged in
harassment of another employee, an applicant for employment,
or a visitor or a vendor, will be subject to disciplinary action, in-
cluding termination. When dealing with an employee in a union-
ized or an organized setting, an employer must consider the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and, perhaps,
the employee's right to have representation at any disciplinary
or investigatory proceeding. Finally, the policy should provide
that anyone who brings a complaint in good faith will not be
subject to adverse employment action. Similarly, any employees,
including supervisors and managers, who retaliate against an-
other employee for making a complaint of harassment will them-
selves be subject to disciplinary action, including termination.69
68 See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (suggesting
that policy giving supervisor exclusive responsibility for receiving reports may dis-
courage reporting and reduce employees' faith when supervisor is alleged harasser).
Such cases of harassment by a supervisor are relatively common. See, e.g., Brooms
v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (harassing supervisor was company's
manager of human resources); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(complainant was harassed by head of naval Equal Employment Opportunity office).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). The relevant section states that "[i]t shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees ... because he has made a charge ... under this title." Id. Retaliation may
involve refusing to promote the complainant, Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269
(D.D.C. 1988); withholding raises, Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.
Ga. 1988); poor performance reviews, Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883
F.2d 1307 (7th Cir. 1989); receipt of more onerous work, Robson v. Eva's Supermar-
ket, 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982); withdrawal of formerly provided courtesies,
Sims v. Madame Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); abolish-
ment of position, Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); demotion, Harri-
son v. Reed Rubber Co., 603 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1985); discharge, Boyd v.
James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, 671 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Tenn. 1987);
and other actions taken in response to an employee's complaint. LINDEMANN &
KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 281.
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Most sexual harassment policies are relatively brief-
usually no more than three pages-and use simple and direct
language. ° As mentioned earlier, when such a policy exists, the
standard for holding an employer liable for harassment by a low
level supervisor,7 a co-employee 2 or a vendor who regularly vis-
its the premises73 is one of negligence.74 The appropriate inquiry
is whether the company knew or had reason to know of the activ-
ity that created the sexually hostile environment and failed to
take prompt remedial action." Under case law and EEOC
guidelines, an employer may avoid liability by showing that it
had implemented a policy against sexual harassment and that
its employees were aware that the company did not condone or
tolerate such conduct." If the complainant had an avenue to
complain and did not come forward, then it is less likely that the
employer knew or had reason to know of the problem and there-
fore would not be in a position to rectify it.77 Thus, by imple-
menting and utilizing an effective anti-sexual harassment policy,
the employer is more likely to be viewed as not condoning or ac-
cepting this kind of activity and less likely to be held liable."
70 See LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 416-17
(suggesting language should be clear to avoid misinterpretation).
7' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th
Cir. 1982).
7' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d); Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
7' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e); see Marentette v. Michigan Host, 506 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (holding employer liable for sexual harassment by nonemployees).
71 See PLAYER, supra note 7, at 254-55 (discussing when harassment becomes
act of "employer" who is then liable for sexually hostile environment created by an-
other); LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 191 (stating
that same general principles of employer liability apply whether harassment is from
supervisors, co-workers, or nonemployees).
7' LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 191-92; see
PLAYER, supra note 7, at 254-55 (discussing employer liability).
71 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986) (quoting Brief for
United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26). See generally PLAYER, supra note 7,
at 254-55 (discussing employer liability).
77 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici
Curiae 26).
7' See Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Co-
Worker Sexual Harassment under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83,
98-9 (1984-85) (discussing how employers may avoid being legally responsible for
sexual harassment).
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C. The Broadening of Sexual Harassment Policies
The EEOC has pending proposed guidelines dealing with
harassment on all the nondiscriminatory base, including relig-
ion, race, color and age.79 As a result, many employers today are
broadening their sexual harassment policies to include all the
nondiscriminatory basis. Diocesan institutions, however, will
not have to include protections against religious discrimination
in their policies. Certainly a church, being religiously uniform,
will have the freedom to hire individuals based on religion. Di-
ocesan institutions may, however, wish to elect to broaden their
harassment policies to include all the nondiscriminatory base
exclusive of religion.
Therefore, the conduct of a manager or a low level supervi-
sor, while it may be imputed to the company as knowledge, may
not result in the imposition of liability if the company responds
properly to seriously address the problem.' If an employee
chooses not to take advantage of available procedures, the em-
ployer should not bear the responsibility.81 The policy needs not
only to be promulgated, it needs to be promulgated widely among
all employees.82 Furthermore, there ought to be some periodic
training for supervisory personnel. If and when a situation
arises, it must be dealt with seriously and the policy needs to be
effectively applied. What courts look for is "immediate and ap-
propriate corrective action."83 Again, the first step is to create
the policy; the second step is to apply it promptly and effectively,
with appropriate action corresponding to the facts of the case.
'9 See generally Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Implementing
Regulations, Making Religious Discrimination in Employment Unlawful, 22 A.L.R.
FED 580 (1994) (discussing expansion of sexual harassment guidelines to religion,
race, color, and age).
'o Merriman & Yang, supra note 78, at 112-13.
" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici
Curiae 26).
82 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f). A number of employers require employees to submit
written acknowledgement of receipt and understanding of the respective employer's
policy against sexual harassment. LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, su-
pra note 23, at 419.
83 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d); see Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987)
(finding remedial action sufficient where employer issued written reprimand);
Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating em-
ployer response less than twelve hours after employee's complaint constituted
prompt remedial action).
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Vignette #3: The Office Paramour
Scene #1
SAM: Marketing Department, Good Morning. How can I help
you? Yes. Well, you will need to talk to my boss, Barbara,
about that, hold on please. (to Barbara) Barb, you'll need to
handle this.
BARBARA: Who is it?
SAM: It's Accounting. I submitted an expense voucher that
needs your approval.
BARBARA: What was it for?
SAM: Expenses.
BARBARA: Oh, okay. I'll take the call here. Hello, this is Bar-
bara. Yes, go ahead and approve it. Yes, I've seen it, I just for-
got to sign it. Okay, sure. Goodbye. (to Sam) Its all taken care
of.
SAM: Thanks babe. What's on the menu for dinner tonight?
BARBARA: Is your wife working late again?
SAM: Yep!
BARBARA: Why don't you come to my place for dinner?
SAM: Okay. Should I dress for dinner?
BARBARA: (laughing) Okay. Come next door, I have to hand out
some new assignments. I've got one that I think is going to get
you a lot of recognition around here.
SAM: Cool!
BARBARA: Okay, folks! I have some new assignments. Sam, you
get the Acme account; Joe you get the Green Bush account; and
Jill you get the Waste Water account. I want your summaries
by the end of today. No questions asked. No excuses.
SAM: Oh, this is great. I can't believe it.
JILL: (to Joe) He can't believe it. No, I can't believe it. I can't
believe that I have been begging for that assignment for weeks,
and Sam walks in the door, with no experience, and snags it
right out from under me. I have been successfully handling as-
signments like that for five years. I can't believe this.
JOE: Well, you know the deal. Lover boy gets it all, the boss and
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the best assignments.
JILL: It's disgusting. He gets the best assignments just because
he's having an affair with Barbara, and I have to put up with it.
All of their lovey-dovey exchanges all day long. Its inappropri-
ate and it makes me sick. I try to do good work and get good
assignments so that I can be promoted. Sam walks in the door
and gets the best accounts. What kind of morality does this
company have that lets its supervisors wreck homes and commit
adultery? Just knowing it makes me so mad that I can hardly
work. I think it is sexual harassment.
Scene Analysis
The question presented by this scene is: Is it sexual harass-
ment for a supervisor to carry on a romantic liaison with a sub-
ordinate and then favor that subordinate in the assignments
given to him or to her to the disadvantage of the other employ-
ees?
Religious employers can obviously terminate employees for
religious reasons under many broad circumstances.8" This could
be one of those situations. However, in a commercial setting,
this action is not, according to the courts and the EEOC, a case
of sexual harassment. 5 Isn't it obvious that the female supervi-
sor is favoring one individual to the disadvantage of the other
employees? Unfortunately, the EEOC and the courts do not see
it this way, and have stated that if this action is an isolated in-
stance of favoritism toward a paramour or one with whom the
'4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Religious organizations may discriminate with respect to
employment of individuals of a particular religion. PLAYER, supra note 7, at 211.
85 See Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa.), affd
mern., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). In Miller, plaintiff was treated less favorably
than her co-worker, who was having an affair with their manager. Id. The court
held that a Title VII claim had not been established because plaintiff was not
treated less favorably because she was a woman, nor, conversely, would she have
been treated more favorably had she been a man. Id. See also DeCintio v. Westches-
ter County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825
(1987) (holding that administrator's promotion of woman he was having an affair
with was unfair, but did not violate Title VII with respect to male employees). But
see King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In King, plaintiff claimed that she
had been denied a promotion that went to a less qualified co-worker engaged in a
sexual relationship with their superior. Id. Although the issue of whether Title VII
applied to preferential treatment was not specifically raised on appeal, the court as-
sumed that Title VII is violated whenever sex is, without legitimate justification, a
substantial factor in the employment decision. Id.
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supervisor has a romantic liaison, it does not constitute sexual
harassment" because it is not gender-based." It is not discrimi-
nation against all men or discrimination against all women; it is
merely the favoritism of one individual employee. If this favorit-
ism is repeated with a number of different people over a period of
time, however, the result will differ. That kind of conduct can,
and frequently will, result in sexual harassment against men or
against women, as the facts may demonstrate." The case of the
isolated office romance, in and of itself, does not give rise to sex-
ual harassment against other employees in that department who
admittedly are disadvantaged in their work assignments. The
EEOC's position is that Title VII does not prohibit isolated in-
stances of preferential treatment based upon consensual roman-
tic relationships. 9 An isolated instance of favoritism toward a
paramour, friend, or even a spouse in the same work place, may
be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men in
violation of Title VII since there is no real gender discrimina-
tion."°
Scene # 2
Barbara: (on phone) No. No. Listen to me! I want that project
by noon tomorrow. I don't care. You promised it to me by yes-
terday and I still don't have it. Okay. Well, I'll tell you what;
you have until noon tomorrow. Tell him he better do it or he's
going to have to deal with the consequences. Bye.
Oh, hi Sam, come right on in.
SAM: Hi, this is the summary report from last week. I'm sorry, I
See Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 501; DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307.
" See Bellisimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that discharge of female employee is violation of Title VII only if it is done
on basis that would not result in firing of male employee), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1035 (1986); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (holding that denial of promotion to woman is not
violation if motivated by personal or political favoritism or grudge).
8' See Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In Priest, the defen-
dant gave preferential treatment to those female employees who favorably reacted
to his sexual advances, and he disadvantaged those who reacted unfavorably. Id.
The court found a Title VII violation in part because defendant's conduct implied
that benefits would be conditioned on an employees endurance of his sexual ad-
vances or conduct. Id. at 581.; Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 244.
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also DiCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
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don't have this week's work quite done yet.
BARBARA: Well, just get it to me whenever you can get it done.
SAM: Okay. Listen, there's one other thing.
BARBARA: Well, what is it? Why don't you sit down?
SAM: Thanks.
BARBARA: What's the matter, Sam?
SAM: Well, I've been doing a lot of thinking about our relation-
ship. I found out some news recently. I know we've talked
about me leaving my wife and all. But I just found out she's
pregnant and I just don't think it's right.
BARBARA: What are you saying?
SAM: I'm saying, I think we should stop seeing each other.
BARBARA: I can't believe this. You can't do this to me.
SAM: I'm sorry, but I'm going to be a father now. I can't just
leave her with no income, being pregnant and all. I mean, the
picture's changed. I've got more responsibilities now.
BARBARA: I can't believe this is happening. How do you expect
me to deal with this? How am I supposed to see you everyday?
Sam, please reconsider. There's no way I can handle seeing you
everyday if you break up with me. Please reconsider.
SAM: What do you mean? You're not saying you're going to fire
me, are you?
BARBARA: (looking at her watch) Oh, God. I'm late. I have to
go. Get that report to me by the time you leave today (runs
out).
SAM: (to the audience) I'm having an affair with my supervisor,
and now I want to break it off. I'm afraid I'm going to lose my
job if I do. I mean, what does she mean by, "There's no way I
can handle seeing you every day if you break up with me." I
break up with her and I get fired? Is this sexual harassment?
Can I make a complaint?
Scene Analysis
Sam voluntarily engaged in a relationship with his supervi-
sor; as in the old Latin phrase, he was in pari delicto. If he
breaks this off, and he is threatened with loss of his job, can he
successfully file a sexual harassment complaint? The answer is
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probably, yes.9 If the threat to Sam is that unless he continues
the relationship, he is no longer going to get the favored assign-
ments, 2 or he is not going get the raise to which he might oth-
erwise objectively and fairly entitled to,93 then, perhaps, he is in
a situation where he could file a complaint. What he would al-
lege would be quid pro quo sexual harassment.9 ' One might ask
whether his prior conduct plays some role in his complaint. The
most important factor is that the complainant clearly indicated
that he wished the relationship to end.95 Furthermore, the
ramifications of the situation must be examined over a long pe-
riod of time, and not telescoped within a matter of moments or
days or weeks. Perhaps Barbara may take some adverse action
against him a year down the road: she has not promoted him;
she gave him the smallest raise in the department; she gave him
the worst of the assignments that came up over the past year. If
he could demonstrate that the reason for his treatment was be-
cause he discontinued the relationship, the EEOC will receive
that complaint and will probably process it and find probable
cause to believe that this individual, despite his prior conduct,
has suffered discrimination. 6 Once the employee clearly indi-
9' See Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Title VII
has been held to protect against quid pro quo conduct whether or not the victim of
harassment had a previous consensual sexual relationship with the perpetrator. Id.
at 287.
92 Id. at 287.
9' See Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
that employee who terminated relationship with her supervisor will prevail on Title
VII claim that supervisor attempted to compel her to submit to further sexual ad-
vances by withholding salary reviews).
See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648
(6th Cir. 1986). In Highlander, the court listed five requirements needed to prevail
on a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment. They are:
(1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) that the em-
ployee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sex-
ual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) that the harassment
complained of was based on sex; (4) that the employee's submission to the
unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job
benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual
demands resulted in tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of re-
spondeat superior liability.
Id. at 648.
9' See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, PRIMER, supra note 1, at 26 (stating
that complainant must "clearly notify" superior-harasser that sexual advances are
no longer welcome).
" See, e.g., Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that com-
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cates that he is no longer prepared to continue to engage in that
conduct, if the supervisor persists in pursuing the relationship or
making him suffer for his decision, from the point the employee
draws that line in the sand, he is being harassed on the job by
his supervisor.
Scene #3
JOE: Hey Barbara. I saw an interesting article about our com-
pany in the paper today. I guess we're newsworthy.
BARBARA: Thanks, Joe. I'll take a look at it later.
JOE: Sure. I was thinking that since Sam quit and there's no
one covering his accounts, things are slipping through the
cracks. Is there any chance that I can get the Acme account?
BARBARA: I don't know Joe, we'll see.
JOE: So, are you free for a drink tonight? Toss back a cold one?
BARBARA: No, Joe. I don't think so.
JOE: Look Barbara, I know you're upset about Sam quitting and
all. I guess that's the way the cookie crumbles. But, I thought
maybe you might want to talk.
BARBARA: I don't think so, Joe. Why don't you get back to work.
JOE: Come on. I've seen you noticing me and I've been noticing
you. Why don't we stop this charade.
BARBARA: I don't know what you're talking about. This is totally
inappropriate. Just stop it!
JOE: Come on! Why don't we go out? It'll be fun.
BARBARA: (exasperated) Okay, look, one drink. Meet me down-
stairs at Harvey's Grill at 5:30 p.m. One drink, that's it.
JOE: Great! You won't regret this.
BARBARA: (to audience) I just did that to get him off my back.
He's asked me out a couple of times, but I have no interest in
seeing him. It's embarrassing. I feel like I've lost control over
my department. I wanted to get rid of him, but in order to do
that, I have to go to my boss. My boss already thinks that
women are weak. If I go to him with this problem, he'll think
that I am an ineffectual manager. He'll tell the people in charge
plainant is entitled to relief on claim that she was passed over for promotion be-
cause of negative input by supervisor she had formerly dated).
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and I'll never get promoted. What can I do?
Scene Analysis
Joe has seen what he believes it takes to get ahead in this
company. Now that Sam has broken things off with Barbara,
Joe decides to try his luck. The situation again involves a
woman who is a supervisor trying to deal with others who are
her subordinates. The first thing to keep in mind is that in a
quid pro quo type of sexual harassment situation, the person
who is attempting to engage in the offensive conduct needs to be
the supervisor because that individual has to have some control
over the terms and conditions of the other individual's employ-
ment in exchange for which the sexual favors or attention are
being sought.97 In the situation at hand, it's the subordinate who
is making advances to the supervisor. The EEOC and the courts
will say that this cannot be a case of quid pro quo sexual har-
assment because Joe does not have the power to affect the job
and the terms and conditions of Barbara's employment." In
Scene #1, Barbara, as the supervisor, controlled the terms and
conditions of Sam's employment. The situation here is reversed,
and therefore the quid pro quo type of harassment is not pres-
ent.99 That leaves the question of whether Joe's conduct is
merely an isolated incident, or whether it is repeated over a pe-
riod of time."°
Whether sexual advances constitute sexual harassment
against Barbara, the supervisor, depends upon whether the con-
duct is so offensive that a reasonable person under the circum-
7 See Highlander v. KF.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir.
1986) (stating unwelcome sexual advances must come from supervisory personnel).
98 See PLAYER, supra note 7, at 252 (sugessting that to be actionable, possible
effect of harassment must be to alter position of victim's employment).
" See Donate v. Rockefeller Financial Servs., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA)
1722, 1723 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding quid pro quo sexual harassment is not action-
able when sexual advances are made by non-supervisor); see also Karibian v. Co-
lumbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2nd Cir. 1994) (stating element of quid pro quo
cause of action is harasser with actual or apparent authority to alter terms and
conditions of victim's employment).
'oo See Morgan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 187 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming
grant of summary judgment to defendant under Title VII where harassment was
limited to few isolated instances); Ebert v. Lamor Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 339
(10th Cir. 1989) (holding "sparse" unwanted touching and use of foul language not
sufficiently pervasive to support Title VII claim).
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stances would be offended.' In Harris v. Forklift Sys.,"' the Su-
preme Court stated that, in order for liability to ensue, it is nec-
essary that not only a reasonable person °3 in that setting be
offended by the conduct, but also that the particular complainant
be offended.' In other words, both an objective and a subjective
test are to be applied.' 5
In Scene #2, we addressed the fact that Sam's wife is preg-
nant. Thus, a moral issue is raised and, under the analysis, is
examined with respect to whether a reasonable person as well as
the particular plaintiff would be offended by the conduct."°
D. General Guidelines for an Effective Client Interview
When interviewing a possible victim of sexual harassment,
it must obviously be asked when the harassment happened,
101 See Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 929 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (finding harassment of manager from subordinate sufficiently offensive to
support Title VII claim); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th
Cir. 1982) (stating hostile work environment may be created by supervisor, co-
worker, or even stranger).
102 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
103 Although the Supreme Court in Harris, defined an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment as one that "a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive," Id. at 370 (reaffirming Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)),
the circuits continue to debate over whether a "reasonable woman" standard would
be more appropriate. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir.
1995) (adopting reasonable woman standard stating objective reasonableness should
be determined from perspective of person with "same fundamental characteristics"
as victim); cf. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n., 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th
Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 USLW 3103 (Aug. 7, 1995) (No 95-214)
(rejecting reasonable woman standard); see also Bonnie B. Westman, The Reason-
able Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 795, 805-09 (1992) (tracing development of reasonable woman
standard and concluding that it would reduce sexual harassment and lead to greater
equality in workplace). But cf. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless
Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177
(1990) (suggesting that reasonable standard may actually perpetuate status quo).
'04 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The Court stated that a plaintiff who is not of-
fended has not had the terms or conditions of her employment altered, and thus,
Title VII has not been violated. Id.
'10 Id. The Court concluded that the two part test takes a "middle path between
making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury." Id.
106 In Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sex-
ual advances were 'unwelcome.'" Id. at 68. Courts have used morality in addressing
unwelcomeness. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
plaintiff who participated in lewd conduct was not sexually harassed.)
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where it happened, and who was present when it occurred." 7 It
should be asked what exactly happened or what exactly was said
from the time of the first word or gesture up through the end of
the conversation or incident."8 Some good questions to ask
would be: What conversation occurred before the incident? What
acts took place during the incident? What was the incident?
What response was made to the harasser when the offensive
conduct occurred? What did you say to the harasser the next
time you saw him or her? Was anyone else present on any occa-
sion? Did you ever tell the harasser that you were offended by
the conduct? If so, what did you say and do? Did you ever tell
the harasser to stop? Did you ever specifically say that you felt
the conduct constituted sexual harassment? Did you talk with
anyone else about it? If you did, with whom did you speak, and
when? Where were you, and what did that person say in re-
sponse? Did you make any notes? Did you make any record of
the incident? Do you know exactly when it occurred? Do you
have a copy of your notes? Can you obtain one? What did you do
after the offensive conduct occurred? And very importantly,
when did you first learn of the sexual harassment policy and
complaint procedure? To whom did you first report the conduct?
If the individual did not use the procedure promptly, ask why.
Did you ever do anything which you believe may have caused the
harasser to believe that you would welcome or at least not be of-
fended by the harasser's conduct? Did you send the harasser a
card? Did you ever give the person a gift? What kind of social
interaction have you had outside the office? Did you, the com-
plainant, ever engage in profane language? Ever engage in other
kinds of off color conversation with the alleged harasser? Did
you ever invite the alleged harasser to go somewhere with you?
And, what action do you want this company to take and why are
you here today? It is suggested that the interviewer be the same
gender as the complainant because there may be greater procliv-
ity to be open and frank when discussing the matter.
E. Damages
By virtue of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act,
1'0 See MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY-PLANNING, ANALYSIS,
AND STRATEGY 68-71 (1988) (discussing general interview techniques).
108 Id.
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the common law remedies provide for greater compensatory and
punitive damages than do those under the federal law."° Under
the common law, there is no specific action for "sexual harass-
ment," albeit, there are several common law torts under which a
complainant can bring action in order to seek redress."' The
federal courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey are more liberal
in allowing a complainant to bring the aforementioned causes of
action to support a claim of sexual harassment."' Since 1991,
compensatory and punitive damages"2 and attorney's fees"' have
been available to a plaintiff prevailing under Title VII. Prior to
1991, many cases may have been treated lightly,"' but today,
these cases have begun to be treated with a great deal of concern
and much seriousness. 5
'" Section 102(b)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that the sum total
of compensatory and punitive damages is subject to a cap that varies with the size of
the respondent, as follows:
Number of EmI2lgyees Cap on Total Damages
15-100 $50,000
101-200 $100,000
201-500 $200,000
more than 500 $300,000
11 See LINDEMANN & KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 23, at 351
(listing common law theories of recovery available to victims of sexual harassment
in workplace: infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, invasion of privacy, defamation, misrepresentation, breach of public policy,
implied contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference
with contractual relations, loss of consortium, and negligent hiring or retention).I See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 524-25 (D.N.J.
1981) (sexual harassment as sword "bears direct similarities to" and "arises out of'
several common law torts).
"2 On Nov. 7, 1991, Congress passed The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Section 102 of the Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, provides that a com-
plaining party suing under Title VII has the right to seek compensatory damages. A
party may recover punitive damages if she can demonstrate that the respondent
discriminated with "malice" or "reckless indifference." A complaining party may de-
mand a jury trial.
" The availability of attorney's fees to the prevailing party is part of the origi-
nal Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). As part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2000e-5(k) was amended to include expert fees.
"1 Prior to the inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages, supra note
112, victims of sexual harassment were limited to equitable remedies such as in-
junctions, backpay, and reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
" See Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 475 (Fall
1993). But cf Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natu-
ral Law on Title VII's Effectiveness; A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 636-
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Attorney's fees can run up claims very quickly."' In many
instances, attorney's fees far outstrip the actual damages that a
plaintiff can either seek or recover."'7 Thus, a client that does
not have a sexual harassment policy in place should be strongly
encouraged to develop a policy, specifically tailored to that client.
The client should understand that, under Title VII, sexual har-
assment is treated as sex discrimination and can lead to very
large damage awards.
37 (Spring 1993) (suggesting that Title VII liability scheme is not sufficient deter-
rent to discrimination because it does not provide criminal liability).
"6 See Cowa v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 935 F.2d 522, 527 (2nd Cir.
1991) (rejecting notion that award of reasonable attorney's fees must be propor-
tional to amount recovered by plaintiff).
11 Id. at 528 (upholding award of attorney's fees in excess of $54,000 on dam-
age award of $15,000); see also Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No.
600, 813 F. Supp. 1112 (E. D. Pa. 1993) (awarding over $83,000 in attorney's fees
despite plaintiff prevailing on only one of six counts and receiving only injunctive
relief), afd without opinion, 43 F.3d 1463 (3d cir. 1994).

